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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for three counts of viola tion of a 
protective order, Class A misdemeanors in viola tion of Utah Code § 76-5-
108. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West Supp. 2014). 
INTRODUCTION 
After having been friends for thirteen years, Nikolaos Antonio 
(Defendant) and Leslie Kerbs (Leslie) engaged in a four-year relationship 
that resulted in the birth their daughter (S.P.). Leslie tes tified that her 
relationship with Defendant ended in February 2013. Leslie stated that she 
sought and was granted a temporary protective order in favor of herself and 




Leslie was later granted a permanent protective order on June 18, 
2014, which was served on Defendant June 19, 2014. The permanent 
protective order prevented Defendant from communicating with Leslie in 
person. Additionally, Defendant was ordered not to contact Leslie by 
phone, email, mail, or in any other way either directly or indirectly. The 
permanent protective order further ordered that Defendant was allowed to 
have day-time visits with S.P. and that defendant was to arrange supervised 
visits through a third-party identified as Jackie Olsen (Jackie) who is Leslie's 
mother. On July 8, 2014, Defendant contacted Leslie by phone at her home 
in Salt Lake County. Leslie testified that she did not recognize the number 
that Defendant called from. She recorded the conversation using an 
application on her cell phone. Leslie called police to report Defendant's 
contact and while talking to police Defendant called her cell phone a second 
time. The second call came from a phone number listed in Leslie's phone as 
"Nik". Leslie stated that she recognized the number from the second call as 
Defendant's and that it had been the same number since sh e had known 
him. Leslie further testified that a third call came to her cell phone and that 
she recognized the number as the same number from the first call she had 
recorded. Leslie answered the phone, but she did not speak. Leslie stated 
that Defendant said "hey" multiple times and she hung up without 
-2-
responding. The jury convicted Defendant of three counts of violation of a 
protective order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did sufficient competent evidence support Defendant's conviction for 
three counts of violation of a protective order? 
Standard of review. When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on 
appeal, this Court does "not re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or 
second-guess the jury's conclusion"; it determines "only whether sufficient 
competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element of the charge, 
whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to enable it to find, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Honie, 
2002 UT 4, il44, 57 P.3d 977 (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-108 (violation of a protective order) 
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• 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1 
A. Summary of facts 
Defendant and Leslie became friends as teenagers and eventually 
engaged in a four-year relationship resulting in the birth of their daughter, 
(S.P.) R.287-88. Their relationship concluded at some point in February 2013. 
R.288. On May 21, 2014, Leslie sought and was granted a temporary 
protective order in favor of herself and S.P. R.289. A permanent protective 
order was later entered on June 18, 2014. R.289-90, 309-10; State1s Ex. 1. The 
permanent protective order was served on Defendant on June 19, 2014. 
R.289-90, 309-10; State1s Ex. 1. Under the terms of the protective order, 
Defendant was ordered to not 11contact, phone, mail, email, or communicate 
in any way with [Leslie], either directly or indirectly. 11 R.290-92; State1s Ex. 1 
(emphasis added). Additionally, the protective order required defendant to 
stay away from Leslie1s home, work, and S.P. 1s daycare. R.292; State's Ex. 1. 
Defendant was allowed to arrange contact with S.P. through Leslie's mother 
or father. R.290-93; State's Ex.l. 
1 On appeal, this Court must "assume that the jury believed the 
evidence that supports the verdict." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ~40, 52 
P.3d 1194. The facts are accordingly "recited in the light most favorable" to 
that verdict. State v. Bravo, 2015 UT App 17, ,r2 n.l, 778 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 
(quotations and ci tation omitted) . 
-4-
At trial, Leslie testified that on July 8, 2014, Defendant telephoned her 
three times in violation of the protective order. R293-303, 305. Leslie was 
able to record the contents of the first call Defendant placed from an 
unknown phone number ending in '1330' ("The 113301 number") using an 
application on her cell phone. R.295-99; 305-06; State's Ex. 2. The 
conversation as recorded is transcribed below: 
Leslie: Hello. 
Defendant: Who's this? 
Leslie: This is Leslie. 
Defendant: What? 
Leslie: This is Leslie .... Who's this? 
Defendant: Oh, hi. 
Leslie: Who's this? 
Defendant: Sorry. 
Leslie: For what? 
Defendant: I didn't mean to call you, I guess. 
Leslie: What do you mean you guess? 
Defendant: I didn 1 t mean to call you? 
Leslie: Okay. 
Defendant: When can I see her? 
Leslie: When can you see [S.P.]? 
Defendant: Yes. 
Leslie: You know you have to talk to my mom about that. You're not 
supposed to be calling me. 
Defendant: [inaudible] one of the days I can go to her house. 
Leslie: You need to call my mom for that, okay? 
Defendant: Are you really doing all this, Leslie? 
Leslie: Do not call m e again. 
R295-99; 305-06; State's Ex.2. 
Leslie reported Defendant's first violation of the protective order 
within 112 minutes" of ending the first call received from the '1330' number. 
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R.299. While reporting the first violation to Unified Police Officer Ryan 
Watson (Officer Watson), Leslie informed Officer Watson that Defendant 
was calling her other line from the number she had saved in her phone 
under "Nik" ending in '2375' (''the 1Nik 1 number") . R299-301; 314; 367-68. 
Leslie did not answer the second call. R.299; State's Exs. 3-4. However, she 
did confirm that the missed call fro1n the Nik number was the same phone 
number she had saved in her phone as Defendant's contact "for years" prior. 
R.300. Shortly after reporting the first and second calls to Officer Watson, 
Defendant called Leslie again using the '1330' number. R.301-02. Leslie 
connected the third phone call; however, she did not speak. R.303. Leslie 
heard Defendant say 11hey11 multiple times h·ying to get her attention and 
then she hung up. Id. Leslie testified that the time between the calls was 
"maybe five minutes". Id. She provided the recording of the first call, and 
two screen shots of Defendant's second and third calls, to police. R.295-302. 
Officer Watson testified that he had a telephone conversation with 
Defendant regarding his phone contact with Leslie on July 8, 2014. R.312-13. 
Defendant denied having contacted Leslie, and confirmed that he was 
aware of an active protective order against him. R. 313. 
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Defendant's Version 
Defendant testified that on June 18, 2014 - the hearing date regarding 
the permanent protective order - he was not present in the hearing, but he 
was inside the courthouse. R.333. After the hearing on June 18, 2014, 
Defendant filled out a prose motion to set aside the protective order. R.335-
36; Def. Ex. 4. Defendant testified that he spoke to a clerk and based on that 
conversation, he believed that if his motion to set aside was filed the same 
date of the hearing, the protective order would no longer be valid. R.337-38. 
Defendant testified that he left the courthouse believing that he did not have 
a protective order against him. R.340. Defendant further stated that he did 
not know that he was calling Leslie and that he was simply returning 
missed calls from numbers on his cell phone. R.342. 
On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that he had missed the 
protective order hearing and that the court had entered the order. R.352. 
Defendant stated that he called the court clerk on June 24, 2014, and July 8, 
2014, regarding his motion to set the protective order aside. R354-55. 
Defendant acknowledged that he was served with the permanent protective 
order on June 19, 2014. R.353, 358. Defendant also agreed that he had not 






In rebuttal, the State recalled Leslie to the stand. R.364-69. Leslie 
testified that she did not know who the '1330' number belonged to and that 
she had not ever called that number. R.365. She further stated that she had 
not called, texted, or emailed Defendant since the protective order had been 
in place. Id. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
On Septe1nber 16, 2014, Defendant was charged by Information with 
one count of violation of a protective order, a Class A misdemeanor, Utah 
Code § 76-5-108. Rl-3. Based on testimony at a preliminary hearing on 
March 10, 2015, the State requested that the court add two additional counts 
of violation of a protective order. R44-45. Defendant was boundover on 
three counts of violation of a protective order, class A misdemeanors, and 
the State subsequently filed an A1nended Information alleging three counts. 
R. 44-45, 53-54. 
A jury trial occurred on Augus t 26, 2015. R158. At trial, the State 
relied on the testimony of Leslie and Officer Watson, as well as State's 
exhibits 1-6. R287-317, 331-68 . 
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After the State rested its case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict 
on all counts, arguing that the State had not produced sufficient evidence to 
prove that Defendant knowingly or intentionally violated the protective 
order on the three counts alleged. R.160, 318-19. The court denied 
Defendant's motion. R.160, 320-21. Defendant then took the stand and stated 
that he filed a motion to set the protective order aside on June 18, 2014; 
however, Defendant conceded that he had been served the permanent 
protective order - the next day - on June 19, 2014. R.331-364. Defendant also 
stated that he did not tell Officer Watson that he believed the protective 
order was inactive. R.363-64. After Defendant rested his case, he renewed 
his motion for directed verdict, which was denied. R369-70. 
The jury convicted Defendant of three counts of violation of a 
protective order. R133, 404. 
The court sentenced Defendant to 365 days in jail for each of the three 
class A misdemeanors. Further, the court suspended 305 days on Count 1; 
and 365 days on Counts 2 and 3. R.181-82. Defendant timely appealed. R. 
189-90. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motions 
for directed verdict. He argues that the evidence presented by the State was 
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insufficient to establish that he knowingly or intentionally violated the 
protective order. However, the evidence presented amply supports the 
jury's verdict finding that Defendant knowingly or intentionally violated 
the protective order. Defendant does not dispute that there was a protective 
order and that he was served with the protective order. Defendant admits 
that he made the first call to Leslie, although claiming to have done so by 
mistake. Leslie confirmed that she heard Defendant's voice during the first 
and third calls. In addition, Leslie was able to identify the phone number 
from the second call - while on the phone with Officer Watson reporting the 
first violation - belonged to Defendant and that he had used that phone 
number for years. Defendant committed all three violations within a short 
time of approximately five minutes. Moreover, Defendant denied contacting 
Leslie while confirming to Officer Watson that he knew there was an active 
protective order. Based on the existing evidence, a reasonable jury could 
find that the ele1nents of these three violations of a protective order had 





Sufficient competent evidence supported Defendant's 
convictions for violation of a protective order. 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions for violation of a protective order and argues that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on each count. He asserts 
that the state "failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support the charged 
crimes." Br.Aplt. at 7. 
But the evidence abundantly proved that Defendant knowingly or 
intentionally violated the protective order on three occasions by telephone 
contact. Leslie recorded and confirmed Defendant's voice on the first phone 
call from the '13301 number, she confirmed the phone number from the 
second missed call as belonging to Defendant for years, and confirmed that 
she heard Defendant's voice on the third call. Moreover, Defendant does not 
dispute the validity or service of the protective order. 
When considering an insufficiency claim, an appellate court does "not 
sit as a second fact finder." Stnte v. Butt, 2012 UT 34, ~24, 284 P.3d 605. 
Instead, it reviews "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict," and it affirms if "some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of 
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the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Maestas, 
2012 UT 46, il177, 299 P.3d 892 (quotations and citation omitted). 
An appellate court does not make'" determinations regarding witness 
credibility."' State v. White, 2011 UT App 162, ,r 8, 258 P.3d 594 (quoting 
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). That determination 
is '"solely within the jury's province."' Id. (quoting Smith, 927 P.2d at 651). 
This Court's inquiry ends when '"there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made."' Id. (quoting State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 
70, ,r 26, 167 P.3d 1074). A jury may convict on the basis of the 
"uncorroborated testimony of the victim." State v. Sisneros, 581 P.3d 1339, 
1343 (Utah 1978)); accord State v. Middlestadt, 579 P.2d 908, 911 (Utah 1978) 
("a conviction may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the 
victim"). 
To prove that Defendant committed three counts of violation of a 
protective order, the State had to put on evidence that Defendant was 
"subject to a protective order'' and that he "intentionally or knowingly 
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violated the order after having been properly served." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-108.2 
At the beginning of trial, the jury heard that Defendant knew there 
was a protective order, it was properly served, and that he contacted the 
protected party.3 Leslie testified that she had been in a relationship with 
Defendant for four years and had known him since she was thirteen years 
old. R.287. Jurors heard that Leslie and Defendant had a four-year-old child, 
S.P. R.288. Jurors also heard that the relationship ended and Leslie sought 
and was granted a temporary protective order on May 21, 2014 in favor of 
herself and S.P. R.288; State1s Ex. 5. Further, the jury was given evidence of 
the court order granting and extension of the temporary protective order 
2 The jury was presented with legal definitions of 11intentionally11 and 
11knowingly11 through instruction no. 14. R.373. 11 [A] person engages in 
conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstance. A person acts knowingly or with 
knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. R.373; see nlso, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-103. 
3 While opening s tatements of counsel are not evidence, it is 
important to note that Defendant1s counsel conceded the elements of 
violation of a protective order were met; although Defendant did offer 
explanation. 1This case is unusual in that we pretty much agree that there 
was a protective order, that it was served, and there was contact. So it is that 
simple and that those three elements are met here." R.285-86. 
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• 
until June 18, 2014, and the permanent protective order executed on June 18, 
2014, and served on the defendant on June 19, 2014. R.289-90, 348-350; 
State's Ex. 1; State's Ex. 6. Based on the protective order, Defendant was 
prohibited from contacting Leslie and S.P. by phone, text, email, and was 
not allowed to go to Leslie's home, work, or S.P.'s daycare. R.292; State's Ex. 
1. 
On July 8, 2014, Defendant contacted Leslie by phone three times; 
twice from the '1330' number, and once from the 'Nik' number. R.293-311, 
364-69; State's Exs. 2-4. 
The First '1330' Number Call 
The first call from the '1330' number was recorded and played for the 
jury. R.296-97; State's Ex. 2; see supra, at page 5. Leslie recorded the first call 
using an application on her cell phone and provided it to police. R.294-95. 
Leslie recognized Defendant's voice after having spoken to him by phone on 
"thousands" of occasions. R.294. While Defendant acted as though he 
mistakenly called Leslie, he continued speaking to Leslie about their 
daughter S.P., and asked if she was "really doing all this ... " seemingly in 
reference to the protective order. State's Ex. 2; Supm a t page 5. Leslie 
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notified Officer Watson within two minutes of Defendant's first call. R.299; 
see also, R.312-13. 
The 'Nik' Number Call 
While speaking with Officer Watson by phone, Leslie reported that 
Defendant was calling her a second time on the other line. R.299, 314. The 
second call was not answered due to Leslie being on the phone with Officer 
Watson. R.299. Leslie took a screen shot of her cell phone showing the 
missed call from the 'Nik' number and provided it to police. R.299-301; 
State's Ex. 3.4 Leslie confirmed the phone number from the second call - the 
'Nik' number - as the number that Defendant had used since she had 
known him and testified that Defendant "had [used] that number for years." 
R.301. 
The Second' 1330' Number Call 
Shortly after speaking with Officer Watson, Defendant called Leslie a 
third time from the '1330' number. R.301. The third call came in from the 
'1330' number, which Leslie recognized as the same number from the first 
call, although she did not know the phone number prior to July 8, 2014. 
R.301-02. Leslie c01mected the phone calt but did not speak. R.303. 
4 State's Exhibit 3 is a screen shot of Leslie's phone depicting the date 
of July 8, a phone number in red with the name Nik above it, and a picture 




Defendant said "hey" multiple times trying to get Leslie's attention; 
however, Leslie did not respond and hung up the phone. Id. A screenshot of 
Leslies phone showing the '1330' number was also provided to police. 
R.302-03. State's Ex. 4. 
Officer Watson's Testimony 
While working on July 8, 2014, Officer Watson received information 
that Defendant had violated an active protective order. R.312. Officer 
Watson spoke to Leslie by phone and was informed that Defendant had 
called Leslie. Id. Using the statewide system, Officer Watson located an 
active protective order that prohibited Defendant from contacting Leslie. Id. 
After speaking with Leslie, Officer Watson received a phone call from 
Defendant regarding an unrelated incident. R.312-13. While talking to 
Defendant, Officer Watson confronted Defendant about the calls made to 
Leslie. R.313. The prosecutor asked, "[o]kay. And when you were speaking 
with [Defendant1' did you talk to him about these phone calls made to 
[Leslie]?" Id. Officer Watson answered, "I did, I asked him about them and 
he denied calling her, making any contact with her." Id. The prosecutor 
continued, "did you inform him of the protective order at that time?" Id. 
Officer Watson s tated, " I did .. . I advised [Defendant] that he wasn't to 
contact [Leslie] in any way because of it and [Defendant] stated he 
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understood and the he was aware there was a protective order against him. 
Id. The prosecutor clarified, "[o]kay. So did [Defendant] indicate that he was 
aware of an active protective order against him?" Id. Officer Watson 
answered affirmatively saying, "[c]orrect11 • Id. 
Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict 
Notwithstanding this evidence, Defendant challenges the trial court's 
denial of his motion for directed verdict by alleging that there was not 
"substantial reliable evidence" presented to establish his convictions for 
violation of a protective order. Aplt.Br. at 11. Defendant insists that he 
mistakenly believed that the protective order was "stayed" by his motion to 
set aside. Id. Defendant argues that he left the courthouse on June 18, 2014, 
believing that there was not a protective order in place. However, 
Defendant conceded that on June 19, 2014 - the day after he filed his motion 
to set the protective order aside - he was served with the protective order. 
R.353. Defendant also acknowledged that the protective order contained 
language under the warnings hearing stating "[t]his is a court order. No one 
except the court can change it. If you do not obey this order, you can be 
arres ted, fined, and face other charges." R.352-53; State's Ex. 1. Defendant 
agreed that he had not spoken to a judge regarding his motion to set the 




regarding his motion to set the protective order was aside is 11 believable 
because he was not represented by an attorney. 11 Br.Aplt. at 13. Defendant 
asserts that his statements that the first call from 113301 number was 
accidental, while also arguing that the fact that he continued talking to her 
demonstrates that he believed he could contact Leslie. Br.Aplt. at 13; R.342-
43. Conversely, Defendant does not refute evidence that Leslie told him he 
knew he was not supposed to be calling her, and that he denied calling 
Leslie at all when speaking with Officer Watson. R.313, 342-43; State's Ex. 2. 
Defendant seizes on his testimony that he did not 11h ave a chance11 to tell 
Officer Watson that the protective order was 11inactive". Br.Aplt. at 14; R.363-
64. Defendant asks this Court to 11believe" his testimony, and disregard 
Leslie and Officer Watson's testimony as mistaken or incorrect. Essentially, 
Defendant seeks to override the jury's decision regarding his credibility. 
However, in assessing Defendant's claim, this Court must II assume that 
the jury believed the evidence that supports the verdict. 11 Fedorowicz, 2002 
UT 67, iJ40. Additionally, this Court does "n ot re-evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses or second-guess the jury's conclusion11 ; it de termines II only 
whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element 
of the charge, whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to enable it to 
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find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." 
Honie, 2002 UT 4, ,r44 (citations omitted). 
In this case, sufficient competent evidence existed which enabled the jury 
to find Defendant committed all three protective order violations, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Acting within its province, the Jury determined that 
Leslie received three calls from Defendant in violation of the protective 
order. The jury was free to believe the testimony of Leslie and Officer 
Watson. Likewise, the jury was free to disbelieve Defendant's testimony. 
The jury was allowed to rely on Officer Watson's testimony that Defendant 
acknowledged that on July 8, 2014, he was subject to an active protective 
order. R.313. Additionally, the jury could reasonably construe Defendant's 
denial that he had called or contacted Leslie as evidence that he knew the 
protective order was in place and did not want to admit violations of that 
order. Id. This Court should not disturb the jury's credibility determination. 
-19-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm . 
.C0.. Respectfully submitted on August~ 2016. 
SIMARJIT GILL 
District Attorney 
CRAIG N. ST ANGER 
Deputy Dish·ict Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
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INDEX TO ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Relevant rules 
• 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED§ 76-5-108 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another -- Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order, 
child protective order, ex parte protective order, or ex parte child protective 
order issued under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act; Title 
78A, Chapter 6, Juvenile Court Act; Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act; or a foreign protection order enforceable under Title 78B, 
Chapter 7, Part 3, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence 
Protection Orders Act, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order 
after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except 
as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse 
Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence 
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance 
with Section 77-36-1.1 . 

